of the deposit liabilities of mnajor mortgage lenders, such as savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and mutual savings banks, have been subject to Regulation Q ceiling rates; indeed, one reason for the removal of these ceilings was to increase the ability of these thrift institutions to attract deposits to use for mortgage lending.z Furthermore, some analysts have suggested that such deregulation has caused mortgage rates to increase more than other long-term interest rates. 3 Table 1 describes the steps that already have been taken in eliminating deposit interest rate ceilings. Many of these steps created new types of accounts, with ceiling rates higher than those on passbook savings accounts or with no ceilings at all. The first significant steps in the i-elaxation of Regulation Q occurred even before the passage of the Depository Institutions 2 Thrifts currently hold around 40 percent ot the one-to four-family residential mortgage debt in the United States. They originate a much greater percentage, however, selling a large proportion of their mortgages to investors in the form ot mortgage passthrough certificates. See McNulty (1983) for a discussion ot mortgage origination and investments of thrift institutions. 3 For instance, Edward Friedman (1983), pp. A.40-A.41, of Chase Econometrics maintains that: The other ma)or effect of the new deposit structure atthrifts and banks is the permanent rise in borrowing costs for deposit institution borrowers relative to open-market rates . . . . The implication is that it, for example, bond rates were to tall to much lower levels, home mortgage rates would not necessarily follow point for point. A~'' '<', '/t',~'"I,
STEPS IN PHASING OUT DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS
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MAY 1984 The Depositosy Institutions Deregulation Committee has the responsibility for complete removal of deposit rate ceilings by 1986. The committee meets periodically during the transition period, and most of the changes described in table I represent the outcomes ofthese meetings. Currently, the only ceilings in effect apply to passbook savings deposits and NOW accounts. 5
THE DETERMINATION OF MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
In analyzing how mortgage rates are determined and how they might be affected by the deregulation of deposit interest rates, we assume that lenders, depositors and borrowers are all wealth-maximizers. In particular-, we assume that lenders attempt to maximize their profits, depositors attempt to get the highest interest return they can for a given degree of nsk, and borrowers search fot-the lowest interest rates, given other contractual characteristics of the loan.
We also make two alternative assumptions about competitive forces in the market for residential mortgages. Under the first assumption, interest rates on residential mortgages are determined in a competitive national mar-ket by the interaction of the total demand for-and supply of long-term credit. Under the second assumption, each depository institution has some market power-that permits it to choose the interest i-ate at which it lends.
In the first case, the phasing out of Regulation Q would increase the supply of long-term credit, due to an increase in savings by those whose returns from saving previously were limited by Regulation Q ceiling rates. The increase in the supply of credit would cause long-term interest rates to fall. This is illustrated in figure 1 as a rightward movement in the supply curve fiom S~to~2 and a reduction in the rate of interest from 4 NOW accounts were available for many years in New England before their introduction nationwide. 5 The prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits is not affected by the MCA. to L. Of course, the decline in rates may be small; it depends on the extent to which deposit rate ceilings limited the incentives for-saving. There would be no change in the relationship between mortgage and other long-term interest rates, since differences in risk and liquidity that determine the spreads in interest iates between various types of long-term secur ties would not be affected by the phase-out of Regulation Q. The conclusion is not dramatically different if residential mortgages are made by specialized lending institutions that have some market power. Ifa firm with mat-ket power-raises its mor-tgage i-ate, it will make fewer loans than if it offered mortgage credit at lower interest ratesY This is illustrated by the downwardsloping demand curve (L)~~) in figure 2. We also assume that the firm must raise the interest i-ate it pays on small-denomination deposits if it wishes to attract more of these deposits~.~~his is illustrated by the upwai-d-sloping supply curve~In conti-ast, the firm can attract all the large-denomination deposits it wants by selling certificates of deposit at the rate of eLenders might have such market power if most borrowers were limited to borrowing from institutions with offices in their local area and if the government restricted the number of institutions that may establish offices in each area. interest determined in a competitive national market.
With no Regulation Qceilings in effect, we assume this interest r-ate is' the lender maximizes profits by lending the amount of mortgages at which the marginal cost (the increase in total cost due to the last dollar increase in mortgage lending) equals the marginal revenue (the increase in total revenue from the last dollar increase in mortgage lending). Marginal cost and marginal revenue are illustrated by MC (the hea~yblack line) and MB, respectively, in figure 2.
The relevant matginal cost curve has two portions:
(1) For deposit levels below Q, it is the marginal cost of attracting small-denomination deposits )MC 5~3 ),since MC 50 is less than the interest rate on large-denomination deposits, ir~,i. (2) For deposit levels above Q~, it is equal to i'< 01 . If the lender-wants to attract more deposits than ft for mortgage lending, it will attract 0,2 as small-denomination deposits and any additional funds as large-denomination deposits. In figure 2 , if thei-e aie no ceilings on deposit rates, the profitmaximizing quantity of mortgage loans is ft with a mortgage rate of~M1 and a rate on small-denomination deposits of i~1 31 .
Suppose regulators impose a maximum interest rate that may be paid on small-denomination deposits of i~0~. 7
The lender will be able to attract only ft of smalldenomination deposits and will have to atttact any additional hinds in the market for large-denomination deposits. Each lender increases its demand for largedenomination deposits, causing the interest i-ate on these deposits to rse (to lLuz, for instance). By constructing a new marginal cost curve in the same manner as before (not shown), we find that the new equilibrium mortgage rate rises to~M2, and the amount of mortgage lending falls to ft. Thus, the theory indicates that a binding ceiling on the interest rates paid on small-denomination deposits results in a higher interest rate on mortgage loans, less mortgage lending, and a higher interest rate on large-denomination deposits.
5 Therefore, the elimination of Regulation Q MC ceilings should result in lower mortgage interest rates.
Given this conclusion, what are we to make of the argument that the phase-out of Regulation Q ceiling rates has caused mortgage interest rates to rise? It is an assertion that is inconsistent with standard economic analysis, which is based on the wealth-maximizing behavior of business firms and individuals.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO MORTGAGE HATES?
We now compare the recent behavior of mortgage interest rates with movements in other-maiket rates and the average cost of hinds for S&Ls. The objective is to determine whether-the evidence supports the argument that deregulation of deposit interest rate ceilings has caused mortgage interest rates to rise relative to other market interest rates of comparable duration. erhe mortgage interest rate series used is published by the Department of Housing and Urban Development: the aver-age interest rate at which residential mortgage lenders make commitments to lend for long-term, fixed-rate conventional loans. The insert on pages 10 and 11 describes several series on residential mortgage interest rates and discusses the basis for choosing this measure.
in the theoretical analysis illustrated in figure 2, Regulation Q ceiling rates are assumed to apply only to small-denomination deposits. This assumption corresponds to the actual structure of ceiling interest rates under Regulation 0, which have exempted deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more for many years. tm
The general conclusions would be the same if all deposits were subiect to a Regula:ion 0 ceiling rate. Imposing a ceiling interest rate on all deposits that is below the unregulated market interest rate would reduce the amount of deposits the lender could attract. The profit-maximizing lender with market power would raise its mortgage interest rate to ration the reduced supply of mortgage credit among its customers. The yield on 10-year U.S. 'I g-easury bonds is used as a measure of the inteiest rate on long-term debt obligations other than residential mortgages." The 10-year maturity approximates the average length of tinie that residential mortgages are outstanding. This is much shos-ter than the stated matur-ities of conventional loans because of the prepayment of a substantial number of mortgage loans before their matut-it'v.
Chart 1 indicates that semiannual averages of the cost of funds to S&Ls, the mortgage interest rate, and Lhe yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds tend to move together over time.'°The relationship between changes in the mot-tgage and bond rates is somewhat closer-(correlation coefficient of 0.897) than between changes in the mortgage rate and the average cost of funds (correlation coefficient of 0.816).
All three series were substantially higher in the late 1970s and 1980s than they had been earlier. 'thus, the phase-out of Regulation Q ceilings allowed S&Ls to bid for funds by offering rates that kept pace with rises in mat-ket interest rates. One indicator-of how rising market interest rates and the phase-out of Regulation Q affected the average cost of funds for thrift institutions is the decline in the share of their deposit liabilities held in the fos-m of passbook savings deposits. Between 
CCCC&C~C C<CCC C~CC~I: 1978 and 1983, savings deposits (subject to fixed interest rate ceilings) fell from over 35 percent of total deposits to less than 15 percent. Meanwhile, the new money market certificates and money masket deposit accounts each grew to represent about 17 percent of total deposits.
Chart 3 plots the same three interest rate series on a monthly basis since May 1979." The relationships among the three series enable us to see that changes in the cost of funds to S&Ls cleasly lag changes in the mortgage t-ate and the Treasury bond rate, usually by about two months. A simple statistical analysis confirms the visual pattern in chart 3. The contemporaneous correlation between changes in the cost of funds and the other two series is actually negative, though not statistically significant. However, the cor-' 1 See Chamberlain, Olin and Mckenzie (1983) for a discussion of the monthly cost of funds data. This series is actually the median cost of funds rather than the average. relation between the current change in the mortgage sate and the change in the cost of hinds two months later is 0.61212
The Rise of Mortgage Rates Relative to Other Long-Term Interest Rates
The behavior of mortgage rates since 1980 appears to lend empirical support to the hypothesis that deregulation has resulted in higher mortgage rates relative to other long-term rates. The average spread between the mortgage rate and the 10-year Treasury bond rate from 1966 to 1979 ranged generally from 1 to 1.75 percentage points; in the 1980s, it has ranged from 2 to 3 percentage points.
' 2 The contemporaneous correlation between changes in the mortgage rate and changes in the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds is 0.794, indicating that interest rates on both kinds of long-term debt instruments are affected simultaneously by the same credit-market influences. 
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Monthly Comparison of Mortgage Interest Rate with Cost of Funds to S&Ls and 10-Year Treasury Bond Yield
Since 1980, however, the average spread between the mortgage rate and the avet-age cost of funds tbr S&Ls also has increased, by roughly the same order of magnitude as the increase in the aver-age spread between mortgage sates and the i-ate on lo-ear-Treasus bonds. The gap between mortgage interest r-ates and the average cost of funds stayed mostly between 2 and 3.5 percentage points before 1980; since then, it has varied between 3.25 and almost 6 percentage points. Therefore, the widening in the spi-ead between mortgage r-ates and the Treasury bond i-ate does not appear to be the result of a higher average cost of funds to S&Ls.
Why, then, did mortgage rates rise relative to rates on Treasury bonds of compasable term to maturity after 1980? The answer appears to involve differences between conventional residential mortgages and Treasury bonds as debt instruments. 'the two major diffes-ences are: II) Most mortgages allow the borrower to pay off his debt befos-e maturity without penalty; and (ZiTher-c is risk of default on mortgage loans. Ti-easury bond holders face neither prepayment risk nor default risk.
Mortgage Rates and the Prepayment Option
Investors must be compensated with higher interest rates on residential mortgages than on Treasury bonds to compensate for-the r-isk of prepayment by debtors.' 1
Mortgage borrowers must pay a higher interest rate for such a call option." The value of this option need not remain constant over time. In particular, its value will be higher during periods of more volatile long-term
For a more thorough analysis of the role of the prepayment option in determining the spread between mortgage interest rates and Treasury bond rates, see Hendershott, Shilling and Villani (1982 ). 1979 1980 1981 1982 MAV 1984 interest rates than during periods of stable rates, because of the incseased likelihood that the ps-epayment option will be exercised. Long-term interest rates were extremely variable by historical standards from 1980 to 1982. Thus, we would expect mortgage rates to rise relative to Treasury bond rates during this period.
The size of the interest rate premium necessary to compensate investors for the prepayment option on residential mortgages can be gauged by examining the spr-ead between the yield on passthrough securities issued by the Government National Mortgage Association IGNMA} and the yield on 10-year Treasury securities. The risk of prepayment is the major-difference between investing in GNMA passthr-oughs and Treasury bonds. Investors who purchase these passthrough securities receive the interest and principal payments from a pool of FHA-VA governmentguaranteed residential mortgages. Thus, there is no more risk of default on the interest and principal payments on GNMA passthroughs than there is for bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury. Any prepayment of the mortgages, however, is 'passed through" to the holders of the passthrough securities.' 4
This feature reduces the probability of a capital gain on GNMA passthrough securities compared with an investment in Treasury bonds. If long-term interest rates decline after an investor buys Treasury bonds, their market value rises, and the investor receives a capital gain if he sells them. In contrast, if long-term interest sates decline after an investor buys GNMA passthrough securities, the mortgages in the investment pool are more likely to be prepaid. Because such prepayments i-educe the size of the potential capital gain, a premium in the form of a higher yield on mortgage passthr-oughs is required to make investors indifferent between them and Ts-easusy bonds.
Chart 4 indicates that the spread between yields on GNMA passthrough securities and 10-year-Treasury bonds rose during 1980 through early 1983. Thus, one reason for the relative mci-ease in mnos-tgage interest rates during those years was a rise in the rate premium necessary to compensate investors for the prepayment option on moi-tgages. ' 4 Another factor that accounts for a small portion of the spread between rates on GNMA passthrough securities and Treasury bonds is the effect of stale and local taxes. Interest earned on Treasury bonds is exempt from state and local taxes, but earnings on mortgage passthroughs are not. There is no reason to suspect that this factor has increased in importance during recent years. There also could be differences in yields on these two assets if investors do not view them as being of roughly equal term to maturity, as we are assuming.
Mortgage Rates and Default Risk
Anothet-reason for the rise in intes'est rates on conventional mortgages since 1980 appears to be a general rise in interest rates on privately issued debt securities relative to yields on securities issued or guaranteed by the federal government. Table 2 shows that the aver-age spread between interest rates on privately issued debt instruments and "t'reasury securities is higher in the generally recessionary period, February 1980 to November 1982 , than in the expansionary period, April 1975 to January 1980 This is a reflection ofthe greater default risk associated with privately issued securities during recessionary periods. In each case, the differences in mean spreads between the time periods are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.'" The pattern of spreads between mortgage and Treasury bond rates is very similar to the pattern of spreads between yields on other privately issued securities and Treasury securities of comparable duration.
'rable 2 also indicates that the spreads between yields on privately issued and U.S. Treasury securities declined to near their-ps-c-I 980 levels a few months after the economic s'ecoveiy began in December 1982. The decline in the spread between the mortgage commitment rate and the et~reasurybond rate occurred despite the authorization of money market deposit accounts -a majos-relaxation of Regi,rlation Q ceiling rates that occuri-ed in the first month of the current recovery.
These observations are supported by the behavior of delinquency mates for mortgages. The percentage of conventional mortgages with payments delinquent for 60 days or more rose steadily from 0.61 per-cent in the second quarter of 1979 to 1.37 percer~tin the first quarter of 1983, then began to decline. Delinquency rates in the 1980s have been substantially higher than in the period 1964-79, which undoubtedly accounts for a substantial pos-tion of the higher-n~ostgagerates relative to Treasury bond rates observed since 1980." "The period from July 1980 to July 1981 is officially classified as an economic recovery. The financial markets, however, did not respond during that period as they typically do during expansionary periods. Stock price indexes were little affected, and the spread between corporate Baa and Aaa bond rates (known to be influenced by cyclical factors) changed little. The lack of response is undoubledly due to the weakness and short duration of the recovery. leSome corporate Baa bonds grant a call option to the issuer. Part of the increase in Ihe spread between the Baa bond rate and long-term Treasury securities, therefore, is accounted for by an increase in the value of this prepayment opfion. The effects of the major factors that appear to account for the s'ise in mortgage rates relative to Treasury bond rates can be seen in table 3 (and also in chart 41. For-the period 1980-82, the premium to compensate for the risk of prepayment (approximated by the spread between the yield on GNMA passthi-ough securities and 10-year 'treasury bondsl was about 73 basis points higher on average than in 1975-79. The default risk premium on privately issued securities not guaranteed by the government (approximated by the spread between interest rates on new conventional residential mortgages and the yield on GNMA passthrough securitiesl was approximately 50 basis points higher on average dusing this period. Therefose, both effects appear to share in the responsibility for highes mortgage interest rates s-dative to Treasury secui-ities in the early 1980s. Both have declined during the current economic expansion.
CONCLUSION
Economic theory suggests that the der-egulation of deposit intes-est rates does not cause mortgage rates to rise and may, in fact, result in lower mortgage interest rates than would otherwise be observed. Nonetheless, many believe that the higher aver-age cost of obtaining loanable funds that results from deregulated deposit r-ates have led to higher-mortgage rates.
Since the intsoduction of new types of deposits with flexible inter-est ceilings (or no ceilings at alli, the average interest r-ate on mortgage loans, the average cost of funds for-savings and loan associations, and market interest rates in genes-al have risen substantially. The notion that higher mortgage s-ates are clue to the removal of deposit interest rate ceilings, however, is not supposted.
Although mortgage rates have moved higher relative to government bond rates of similar duration following the beginning of deregulation, that pattern appears to be unrelated to the deregulation of deposit rates. Instead, it was the result of more variable interest rates, which caused a higher premium for the option of prepaying a mortgage loan, and the economic downturn in the early 1980s, which raised the premium for the risk of default on mortgages. Since interest rates have become less variable and an economic expansion has begun, the spreads between mortgage rates and government bond rates have fallen over the last year to close to their pre-1980 level.
